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Diego Feijer Ketan Savla Emilio Frazzoli
Abstract— We study a dynamic vehicle routing problem
where demands are strategically placed in the region by an
adversarial agent with unitary capacity operating from a depot.
In particular, we focus on the following problem: a system
planner seeks to design dynamic vehicle routing policies for
a vehicle that minimize the average waiting time of a typical
demand, defined as the time difference between the moment the
demand is placed in the region until its location is visited by
the vehicle; while the agent aims at the opposite, strategically
choosing the spatial distribution to place demands. We model
the problem as a complete information zero-sum game and
characterize an equilibrium in the limiting case where the
vehicle travels arbitrarily slower than the agent. We show that
such an equilibrium is constituted by a routing policy based
on performing successive traveling salesperson tours through
outstanding demands and a unique power-law spatial density
centered at the depot location.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, considerable efforts have been devoted
to dynamic vehicle routing problems, where the objective is
to cooperatively assign and schedule demands among a team
of vehicles for service requests that are realized in a dynamic
fashion over a region of interest [3], [4], [7]. These problems
provide a rich framework for a variety of applications such as
surveillance missions, environmental monitoring, automated
material handling and transportation networks. Throughout
the existing literature, demands are assumed to be generated
over time by an exogenous process that is unaffected by the
routing policies, and in particular is non-adversarial [7]. A
recurrent theme is that demands are either customers that
need to be picked up, raw material or merchandise to be
delivered, failures that must be serviced by a mobile repair
person, etc. However, there are many scenarios, including
surveillance missions, where there is an inherent conflict
of interest between the process generating demands and the
system planner designing routing policies. Moreover, even in
non-adversarial scenarios the system planner may not have
perfect information about the underlying process generating
demands and a study of strategic dynamic vehicle routing
can add insight into policies that are robust with respect to
such uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, settings with
these characteristics have not yet been studied.
In this paper, we consider the following problem: a system
planner seeks to design dynamic vehicle routing policies for
a vehicle that minimize the average waiting time of a typical
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demand, defined as the time difference between the moment
the demand is placed in the region until its location is visited
by a vehicle; while an adversarial agent with unitary capacity
operating from a depot, aims at the opposite, strategically
choosing the spatio-temporal stochastic process of demands.
A novel feature of this setup is that, since demand generation
is tied to the motion of the agent, there is a dependence
between the spatial and temporal aspect of the demand
generation process: the point process is thus completely
specified by the spatial distribution. This is in stark contrast
with the conventional setup for dynamic vehicle routing
problems, where the spatial and temporal components of
the demand generation process are typically assumed to be
independent.
We model the problem and its inherent pure conflict of
interests as a complete information zero-sum game with
two players: the system planner and the adversarial agent,
with the average system time being the utility function.
In the limiting regime when the vehicle travels arbitrarily
slower than the adversarial agent, we show that the game
has a finite value and we characterize an equilibrium (or
saddle point) of the game. This saddle point is shown to
consist of a routing policy performing successive traveling
salesperson (TSP) tours through outstanding demands and
a unique power-law spatial density centered at the depot
location. The saddle point routing policy is the one proposed
in [4], where it is shown to be optimal for the setup where
the demands are generated by an arbitrary spatio-temporal
renewal process with a very high arrival rate. In order to
rigorously determine the saddle point spatial distribution
for the adversary we rely on Fenchel (conjugate) duality
[15] and results from [5], [6] concerning the maximization
of concave integral functionals subject to linear equality
constraints. Such mathematical tools could also be brought
to bear on the study of dynamic vehicle routing with partial
information about demand generation, where the goal is to
design routing policies with performance guarantees under
worst case scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
contains basic notions on classic convex theory, as well as
duality results for partially finite optimization (optimization
of a functional subject to a finite number of constraints);
Section III describes the problem and the zero-sum game
theoretic formulation; in Section IV we review the recur-
sive TSP-based routing policy and its optimality for the
conventional dynamic vehicle routing setup, and we show
that the value of the game is obtained by maximizing a
functional over the space of integrable functions, where the
maximizer constitutes the saddle point spatial density of
demands; simulations are presented in Section VI, while
conclusions and future work are discussed in Section VII.
II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
A. Basic Concepts and Notation
A point x in the n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn will
be conceived as a column vector, where xi denotes its i-
th component. The inner product of two vectors in Rn will
be written as 〈x,y〉 = xTy = ∑i xiyi. The non-negative
orthant is the set Rn+ = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0}, where ≥ is to
be understood component-wise.
We now introduce some basic concepts from convex
analysis, as found in [2], [15]. The epigraph of an extended
real-valued function f : X ⊆ Rn → [−∞,+∞] is the set
epi f = {(x, w) ∈ Rn+1 : x ∈ X,w ∈ R, f(x) ≤ w};
its effective domain is defined as dom f = {x ∈ X : f(x) <
∞}, which is the projection of epi f on Rn. We say that the
function f is proper if f(x) < +∞ for at least one x ∈ X
and f(x) > −∞ for all x ∈ X ; and f is said to be closed,
if its epigraph is a closed set. A proper convex function f :
R → (−∞,+∞] is said to be: essentially strictly convex
if f is strictly convex on strictly convex on dom f ; and
essentially smooth if f is differentiable on the interior of
dom f and ‖f ′(xk)‖ → ∞ for any sequence {xk} in the
interior of dom f such that xk → x with x in the boundary
of dom f . Given a set X ⊆ Rn, we define its indicator
function δ : Rn → (−∞,+∞] as
δ(x|X) =
{
0 if x ∈ X,
∞ otherwise. (1)
The affine hull of a subset X of Rn is the smallest affine set
containing X . The relative interior of X , denoted ri X , is
defined as the interior which results when X is considered
as a subset of its affine hull. The key property of relative
interiors is that if X is a nonempty convex set, then ri X is
nonempty and convex as well (in contrast to the interior of
X , which is certainly convex but might be empty). Often,
finding the relative interior of a set based on its definition
might be cumbersome. The next lemma, as stated in [2],
provides an equivalent characterization for convex sets.
Lemma 1: Let X be a nonempty convex set. Then, x ∈
ri X if and only if, for every y ∈ X there exists a scalar
α > 0 such that x+ α(x− y) ∈ X .
We end this section with a generalized version of the
classical Weierstrass theorem concerning the existence of
minima of an extended real-valued function.
Theorem 1: Let f : Rn → (−∞,+∞] be a closed proper
extended real-valued function. If there exists η ∈ R such
that the level set {x ∈ dom f : f(x) ≤ η} is nonempty and
bounded, then the set of minima of f over Rn is nonempty
and compact.
B. Conjugate Functions and Fenchel Duality
Let V and V ⋆ be vector spaces, equipped with a bilinear
product 〈·, ·〉 on the product space V × V ⋆, and consider
a convex function f : V → [−∞,+∞]. The (Fenchel)
conjugate function of f with respect to 〈·, ·〉, is a function
f⋆ : V ⋆ → [−∞,+∞] defined as
f⋆(x⋆) := sup{〈x,x⋆〉 − f(x) : x ∈ V }. (2)
Fenchel’s duality theory is concerned with the problem of
minimizing the difference of two proper functions, f − g,
convex and concave respectively. The following duality the-
orem resides in the connection between minimizing f − g
(convex) and maximizing g⋆ − f⋆ (concave).
Theorem 2: Let V and V ⋆ be vector spaces paired by a
bilinear product 〈·, ·〉 defined on V ×V ⋆. Let A : V → Rn be
a linear map with adjoint AT , and let f : V → (−∞,+∞]
and g : Rn → [−∞,+∞) be proper functions, convex and
concave respectively. If the constraint qualification
ri (Adom f) ∩ ri (dom g) 6= ∅
is satisfied, then
inf
x∈V
{f(x)− g(Ax)} = sup
ξ∈Rn
{g⋆(ξ)− f⋆(AT ξ)},
with the supremum on the right being attained when finite.
The reader is referred to [15] for the proof in the case
where V has finite dimension, and to [6] when V is infinite-
dimensional. The latter case is often called partially finite
because the linear operator A maps V into Rn.
C. Partially Finite Convex Programming in L1
Let S ∈ Rn be a finite Lebesgue measure set, and let
h : R→ R be a closed proper convex function. Consider the
(convex) functional I : L1(S) → [−∞,+∞] defined as in
[16] by
I(ϕ) =
∫
S
h(ϕ(x))dx. (3)
Now, consider the following optimization problem:
inf I(ϕ) s.t. Aϕ = b, ϕ ∈ L1(S), (4)
where b ∈ Rn and A : L1(S) → Rn is a continuous linear
map with components Ai ∈ L∞(S) defined by
(Aϕ)i =
∫
S
Ai(x)ϕ(x)dx, for i = 1, . . . , n. (5)
The most widely encountered instance of (4) is the problem
of entropy optimization (see [10] and references therein),
where the goal is to describe the statistical properties of an
underlying stochastic process from a finite set of measure-
ments of its moments.
Problem (4) is amenable to solve through Fenchel duality.
Let V = L1(S) and V ⋆ = L∞(S), then it is possible to
define a bilinear product on V × V ⋆ by,
(ϕ, ϕ⋆) 7−→ 〈ϕ, ϕ⋆〉 :=
∫
S
ϕ(x)ϕ⋆(x)dx. (6)
As the following result [14] shows, to compute the convex
conjugate of the integral functional (3) with the bilinear
product defined in (6), we may just conjugate the integrand.
Proposition 1: Let S be a finite measure set in Rn, and
let V and V ⋆ be as above with bilinear product given by
(6). Then, for any ϕ⋆ ∈ V ⋆, we have
I⋆(ϕ⋆) =
∫
S
h⋆(ϕ⋆(x))dx. (7)
A direct application of Theorem 2 and Proposition 1, with
f := I and g(Aϕ) := −δ(Aϕ−b|0), yields the next result.
Corollary 1: Consider the problem defined by (4) and (5),
and assume that the constraint qualification
b ∈ ri (Adom I), (8)
holds. Then, (4) is equal to
sup {〈ξ,b〉 − I⋆(AT ξ) : ξ ∈ Rn}, (9)
where AT : Rn → L∞(S) is the adjoint map, given by
AT ξ :=
∑n
i=1 ξiAi. Moreover, the supremum on the right-
hand side of (9) is attained by some ξ∗ whenever finite.
Problem (4) will be referred to as the primal problem, and
ϕ ∈ L1(S) the primal variable; (9) is the dual problem, and
the vector ξ ∈ Rn the dual variable or simply multiplier. The
dual is always a convex problem, regardless of the structure
of the primal. The following proposition gives sufficient
conditions for the uniqueness of ξ∗.
Proposition 2: If the set of constraint functions {Ai}ni=1
is linearly independent and h⋆ is essentially strictly convex,
then any optimal dual solution is unique.
We now have all the ingredients required to state the
chief result in [5], which yields the existence, uniqueness
and characterization of the primal optimal solution ϕ∗(x) ∈
L1(S) in terms of (h⋆)′, the optimal dual solution ξ∗ and
the linear operator of constraints A.
Theorem 3: Consider the primal-dual pair (4)−(9) of
Corollary 1. Assume that h is an essentially strictly convex
and essentially smooth function, and suppose the following
condition is satisfied:
∆ := lim
x→∞
h(x)
x
> ess sup
x∈S
AT ξ∗(x). (10)
Then, the primal optimal solution is given by,
ϕ∗(x) := (h⋆)′(AT ξ∗(x)) = (h⋆)′
(
n∑
i=1
ξ∗iAi(x)
)
, (11)
where ξ∗ ∈ Rn is the dual optimal solution.
The proof of Theorem 3 builds on results derived in [14]
regarding the subgradients of convex integral functionals, and
is mainly based on differentiating the dual objective function
at the optimum.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a bounded set S ⊆ R2 with µ(S) > 0, where
µ(·) is the Lebesgue measure. Let S be closure of S and
assume that for every x ∈ S there exists a ball B centered
at x, such that µ(B ∩ S) > 0. An infinite number of
targets/demands are stored in a depot located, without any
loss of generality, at the origin 0. These targets are picked up
from the depot, carried and dropped in S by an adversarial
agent traveling in straight lines at unit speed. The placement
locations are sampled independently from a spatial density
ϕ : S → R+. We assume that the agent has unitary target
carrying capacity, i.e., he returns to the depot in between
placing successive targets, and when he returns to the depot
he spends an average time τ > 0. The rate at which demands
are placed in S by the agent adopting spatial distribution ϕ
is thus given by
λϕ =
1
2Eϕ[‖X‖] + τ , (12)
where X is the location of an arbitrary demand. From (12)
we observe that the demand generation stochastic process is
completely specified by the spatial density ϕ. In particular,
in order to sustain a higher rate, the density has to be
more concentrated around 0; alternately, as demands are
distributed further away from the depot, the smaller is the
arrival rate λϕ. This dependence between the temporal rate
and spatial density of demands is a novel feature in our
formulation as compared to conventional setup for dynamical
vehicle routing problems, where the temporal and spatial
components of the demand point process are typically as-
sumed to be independent.
Demands have to be serviced by a vehicle1, traveling at
speed v. In order to service a target, the vehicle has to
physically travel to the location of the target, and we assume
without loss of generality, that the on-site service time is
zero. A routing policy is said to be stable if the expected
number of outstanding demands is bounded almost surely at
all times. In this paper, we are further interested in spatially
unbiased policies. A policy is said to be spatially unbiased
if for every pair of sets S1,S2 ⊆ S,
E[T |X ⊆ S1] = E[T |X ⊆ S2],
where T represents its waiting time. The results for spatially
biased policies follow along similar lines.
Let Π denote the class of spatially unbiased stable policies
and let F = {ϕ : S → R+ s.t. ∫S ϕ(x)dx = 1} be the
set of spatial probability distributions with support S. Let
Ti(pi, ϕ) represent the time elapsed from the moment the
agent places i-th demand at its location until the vehicle
reaches its location, while the agent is placing targets accord-
ing to distribution ϕ ∈ F and the vehicle is implementing
routing policy pi ∈ Π. Define the system time T : Π×F by
T (pi, ϕ) := lim sup
i→∞
Eϕ[Ti(pi, ϕ)]. (13)
Expressions for the average system time T in dynamic
vehicle routing problems are available only in the extremes
of system load λ/v, light or heavy. Here we focus on the
heavy load regime, λ/v → ∞. However, in this setup the
1We assume a single vehicle for the sake of simplicity. The analysis
presented here does not change qualitatively when there are multiple
vehicles.
target generation rate, as given by (12), is intertwined with
the spatial density ϕ; therefore, we perform our analysis for
the limiting case v → 0+ so that λϕ/v → +∞ for any
ϕ ∈ F .
In the context described above, we consider a two-player
complete information zero-sum game between the system
planner seeking to design routing policy for the vehicle and
the adversarial agent placing demands, with the system time
defined in (13) as the utility function. In other words, in this
strictly competitive setting, the agent will seek to maximize
the system time, while the goal of the system planner is
exactly the opposite. A solution, or equilibrium, of the game
will be a pair (pi∗, ϕ∗) ∈ Π×F for which
sup
ϕ∈F
inf
π∈Π
T (pi, ϕ) = T (pi∗, ϕ∗) = inf
π∈Π
sup
ϕ∈F
T (pi, ϕ). (14)
A pair (pi∗, ϕ∗) satisfying condition (14) is called a saddle
point for the function T . In this paper, we are interested in
characterizing one such saddle point.
IV. AN OPTIMAL ROUTING POLICY
Consider the following policy proposed in [4], which we
will refer to as pi∗:
Unbiased TSP-based Routing Policy: Let r be a large
enough positive integer. From a central point in S partition S
into r sets S1, . . . ,Sr, such that
∫
Sk
ϕ(x)dx = 1/r. Within
each set of the partition, form sets of demands with size n/r,
and as these sets are constructed, deposit them in a queue
and service them in a “first come, first served” fashion. The
service of each set is achieved by constructing a TSP tour
and following it in an arbitrary direction. Finally, optimize
over n.
It was shown in [4] that in the limit as λ/v → +∞,
T (pi∗, ϕ) ≥ β
2
2v2
λϕ
(∫
S
√
ϕ(x)dx
)2
(15)
for any ϕ ∈ F , where β ≃ 0.7120 is a constant that
appears in the asymptotic result for the length of the shortest
path in the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) over the
Euclidean plane [1]. Moreover, it was proved in [18] that
infπ∈Π T (pi, ϕ) = T (pi
∗, ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ F . Hence,
sup
ϕ∈F
T (pi∗, ϕ) = sup
ϕ∈F
inf
π∈Π
T (pi, ϕ) ≤ inf
π∈Π
sup
ϕ∈F
T (pi, ϕ),
where the last inequality follows from the min-max in-
equality, which holds true on any product space (see e.g.
[2]). Since infπ∈Π supϕ∈F T (pi, ϕ) ≤ supϕ∈F T (pi∗, ϕ) (by
definition of infimum), we arrive at
sup
ϕ∈F
inf
π∈Π
T (pi, ϕ) = sup
ϕ∈F
T (pi∗, ϕ) = inf
π∈Π
sup
ϕ∈F
T (pi, ϕ).
Therefore, if there exists a ϕ∗ ∈ F such that T (pi∗, ϕ∗) =
supϕ∈F T (pi
∗, ϕ), then it would constitute, together with pi∗,
a saddle point of T as v → 0+. The next section is devoted
to finding such a ϕ∗.
Remark: Note that the complete information assumption
implies that the system planner has perfect knowledge of
the spatial density ϕ, needed to implement pi∗. This could,
for example, be achieved if the system planner has an
estimator to learn ϕ. We leave the investigation of such
learning/adaptive routing policies for future work.
V. THE SADDLE POINT SPATIAL DENSITY
The optimal spatial density that will maximize the system
time as v → 0 when the routing policy is pi∗ will emerge as
the solution to the following optimization problem:
sup
ϕ
λϕ
(∫
S
√
ϕ(x)dx
)2
s.t. ϕ ∈ F . (16)
In its original form, problem (16) is the product between a
convex and a concave function. Hence, it is not convex thus
hard to tackle. However, applying a logarithmic transforma-
tion to the objective function and introducing a new variable
γ := logλϕ yields the following equivalent formulation
sup
γ,ϕ
γ + 2 log
∫
S
√
ϕ(x)dx s.t. γ ∈ Γ, ϕ ∈ F . (17)
Since 0 ≤ Eϕ[‖X‖] ≤ max
x∈S
‖x‖, from (12) it can be
easily seen that
Γ = −
[
log
(
2max
x∈S
‖x‖+ τ
)
, log τ
]
⊂ R. (18)
Expressing the dependence of ϕ on the real variable γ allows
us to rewrite (17) as
sup
γ∈Γ
{
γ + 2 sup
ϕ∈Fγ
log
∫
S
√
ϕ(x)dx
}
, (19)
where
Fγ =
{
ϕ : ϕ ∈ F , Eϕ[‖X‖] = e
−γ − τ
2
}
. (20)
Problem (19) decouples the spatio-temporal dependence of
the stochastic process of demand locations, splitting (16) into
two connected sub-problems: one for the spatial component,
and another one for the temporal component. The former
entails a maximization over an infinite-dimensional space to
determine an optimal parametric family of spatial probability
densities, parametrized by γ; the latter is a scalar maxi-
mization which yields the optimal rate, therefore completely
identifying the optimal density from the previously found
parametric family, rendering the solution to (16) and the
saddle point density for the game.
A. The Optimal Parametric Family
Given γ ∈ Γ, we wish to solve
sup
{
log
∫
S
√
ϕ(x)dx : ϕ ∈ Fγ
}
,
or equivalently,
inf I(ϕ) :=
∫
S
−
√
ϕ(x)dx s.t. ϕ ∈ Fγ . (21)
First let us note that, as stated by the following lemma,
problem (21) is feasible for every γ ∈ Γ and has a value
of zero when γ lays at the boundary of Γ in (18).
Lemma 2: For every γ ∈ int Γ, there exists a density
ϕ ∈ Fγ . Moreover, when γ belongs to the boundary of Γ the
value of (21) is zero.
Proof: Let y ∈ A = {x ∈ S : x ∈ argmax
x
‖x‖}, and
note that µ(A) = 0. Because of the smoothness assumption
imposed on the set S, there exist balls B and B′ centered at 0
and y with radius r and r′ respectively, such that µ(B∩S) >
0 and µ(B′ ∩ S) > 0. Clearly, we can reduce the radii
and still maintain the same property. Let ϕr and ϕr′ denote
the densities associated with uniform distributions defined
over B and B′, respectively. Then, limr→0 Eϕr [‖X‖] = 0
and limr′→0 Eϕr′ [‖X‖] = maxx∈S ‖x‖. Furthermore, these
limiting values will only be achieved by singular distributions
with supports over {0} and A, respectively; therefore, the
integral in (21) is zero for γ on the boundary of Γ defined
in (18). Now consider a density ϕ defined as a linear
combination of ϕr and ϕr′ , with support over B∪B′. Then,
by the linearity of the expectation we get for every α ∈ [0, 1],
Eϕ[‖X‖] = αEϕr [‖X‖] + (1− α)Eϕr′ [‖X‖].
Thus, given γ ∈ Γ with appropriate choices of r, r′ and α
we can always construct a density ϕ ∈ Fγ .
Define the continuous linear map A : L1(S) → R2 with
linearly independent components given by,
Aϕ =
( ∫
S
ϕ(x)dx∫
S
‖x‖ϕ(x)dx
)
, (22)
and let bγ ∈ R2 be the column vector
(
1, e
−γ−τ
2
)
. Then,
expressing the constraints that define Fγ in (20) in terms of
A and bγ , we can rewrite problem (21) as
inf I(ϕ) s.t. Aϕ = bγ , ϕ ≥ 0, ϕ ∈ L1(S). (23)
Since the objective function is convex in ϕ and the equality
constraints defining Fγ are linear, problem (21) is convex
thus amenable to solve through Lagrange duality. The La-
grangian for this problem is the function L : L1(S)×R2 →
R defined as L(ϕ, ξ) := I(ϕ) + 〈ξ,bγ −Aϕ〉. If some
constraint qualifications are met, assuring that strong duality
holds, then the solution to (21) can be obtained by solving
sup
ξ∈R2
inf
ϕ≥0
L(ϕ, ξ).
For the minimization over ϕ one might be tempted to
differentiate the Lagrangian (in the Fre´chet sense [12]);
however, the Lagrangian is nowhere differentiable since the
positive cone {ϕ ∈ L1(S) : ϕ ≥ 0} has empty interior
and its complement is dense in L1(S). As a result, this
approach cannot be rigorously justified (see [5] for further
discussions).
To bypass this technical difficulty we will cast problem
(21) under the conjugate duality framework presented in
Section II-C. Defining the function
h(x) := −√x+ δ(x|R+), for all x ∈ R, (24)
we can further rewrite (23) as
inf I+(ϕ) :=
∫
S
h(ϕ(x))dx s.t. Aϕ = bγ , ϕ ∈ L1(S).
(25)
Note that the integrand h is proper and convex. Moreover,
we claim that it is also closed. Indeed, consider a sequence
{xk, wk} ⊆ epi h such that (xk, wk) → (x,w) as k → ∞.
We can assume that {xk} ⊆ dom h given that restricting a
function to its effective domain does not change its epigraph.
Then, since dom h = [0,∞) is a closed set, it follows
that x ∈ dom h, thus w ≥ limk→∞−√xk = −√x. This
implies that (x,w) ∈ epi h, which shows the closedness of
h. Consequently, formulation (25) exhibits the same structure
as (4), and the results in Section II-C are applicable.
The next conjugate duality theorem will be of great
significance in the subsequent analysis. It determines the dual
of (25) and states that the duality gap is zero. Before we
formally state and prove the theorem, we need the following
key lemma.
Lemma 3: bγ ∈ ri (Adom I+), for every γ ∈ int Γ.
Proof: By definition, ri (Adom I+) is equal to
ri {d ∈ R2 : ∃ϕ ∈ L1(S) ∩ dom I+ s.t. Aϕ = d},
and because {ϕ ∈ L1(S) : ϕ ≥ 0} ⊂ dom I+, it follows
from Lemma 1 that ri (Adom I+) = {d ∈ R2 : d > 0}.
The fact that bγ > 0 yields the claimed result.
Theorem 4: Let Γ be defined as in (18), and let int Γ
denote its interior. Then, for every γ ∈ int Γ the dual of
problem (25) is given by
D(γ) := sup
ξ∈R2
{
〈ξ,bγ〉+
∫
S
dx
4AT ξ(x)
: AT ξ < 0
}
,
(26)
where AT : S → L∞(S) is the adjoint map, given by
AT ξ(x) = ξ1 + ξ2‖x‖. Furthermore, (26) admits a unique
solution ξ∗(γ), and the optimal value achieved is finite and
equal to the infimum in (25).
Proof: The dual of problem (25) is given by,
sup
ξ∈R2
{〈ξ,bγ〉 − I⋆+(AT ξ)} ,
and since the conjugate of the integrand function h defined
in (24) is,
h⋆(y) = sup
x≥0
{xy +√x} =
{
− 1
4y y < 0,
∞ otherwise, (27)
by Proposition 1 it must be equal to
sup
ξ∈R2
{
〈ξ,bγ〉+
∫
S
dx
4AT ξ(x)
: AT ξ < 0
}
.
From Lemma 3 it follows that for every γ ∈ int Γ
the constraint qualification (8) is satisfied, and Corollary 1
implies that (26) is equal to (25) (thus equal to (21)).
Over the set
M = {ξ ∈ R2 : AT ξ(x) < 0, for all x ∈ S}, (28)
that describes the maximization space in the dual problem,
we must have 〈ξ,bγ〉 < 0. To see this, consider an arbitrary
γ ∈ int Γ and let ϕ be a density with support over S such
that Aϕ = bγ , whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma
2. Then, for every x ∈ S we have ϕ(x)(ξ1 + ξ2‖x‖) < 0;
hence,
〈ξ,bγ〉 = ξ1
∫
S
ϕ(x)dx + ξ2
∫
S
‖x‖ϕ(x)dx < 0.
Therefore, the dual optimal value is bounded above by zero;
thus it must be achieved at some ξ∗(γ). Finally, the fact that
h⋆ is essentially strictly convex (it is strictly convex over
its effective domain) and the set of functions {1, ‖x‖} that
define A is linearly independent, implies through Proposition
2, that ξ∗(γ) is unique for every γ ∈ int Γ.
Corollary 2: ξ∗1(γ) < 0, for every γ ∈ int Γ.
Proof: Given that ξ∗ ∈ M, we have AT ξ∗(γ)(x) =
ξ∗1(γ) + ξ
∗
2(γ)‖x‖ < 0 for all x ∈ S. Hence, letting x = 0
renders the result.
Based on the preceding theorem, the following proposition
characterizes the unique optimal parametric family of spatial
densities.
Proposition 3: Consider the optimization problem defined
by (21) and (20). Then, for every γ ∈ int Γ the unique
optimal solution is given by,
ϕ∗γ(x) =
1
4(ξ∗1(γ) + ξ
∗
2 (γ)‖x‖)2
, for all x ∈ S. (29)
Proof: The function h defined in (24) is both essentially
strictly convex and essentially smooth. Indeed, it is strictly
convex and differentiable when restricted to its effective
domain [0,∞), and |h′(x)| = x−3/2 which tends to ∞ as
x→ 0. Moreover, h satisfies the growth condition (10) since
∆ = 0 > ess sup
x∈SA
T ξ
∗(x). Then, invoking Theorem
3 we conclude that for every γ ∈ int Γ, the optimal
solution to (21) is given by ϕ∗γ(x) = (h⋆)′(AT ξ∗(γ)(x))
for all x ∈ S, where ξ∗(γ) is the unique dual solution
determined by Theorem 4. Finally, from (27) we have that
(h⋆)′(x) = 1/4x2 for all x < 0, and we thus arrive at (29).
Remarks:
• Through the use of conjugate duality, Theorem 4, we
have transformed the infinite-dimensional optimization
problem (21) into a maximization of a strictly concave
function over a convex set in R2, and although the
unique solution to (26) cannot be expressed in closed
form it can be efficiently found numerically.
• The solution ϕ∗γ(x) obtained in Proposition 3 belongs
to C(S), the set of continuous functions with support
over S which is dense in L1(S) and has a positive
cone with non-empty interior. We could have chosen
C(S) as the underlying working space and solve (21)
through differentiation of the Lagrangian; however, the
uniqueness result obtained for L1(S) is much stronger.
B. The Optimal Parameter
We now study the optimization over γ in (19), and show
that there exists a unique solution γ∗. Since for every
γ ∈ int Γ the dual optimum ξ∗(γ) is unique, γ∗ will
determine the unique spatial density ϕ∗ := ϕ∗γ∗ from the
family described in (29) that attains the maximum in (16).
We start by providing some results concerning the behavior
of ξ∗ as a function of γ ∈ int Γ, that will play a key role in
establishing the existence and uniqueness of the solution to
(19). Specifically,
Proposition 4: Consider the dual problem defined in (26).
Then, the function ξ∗ : int Γ → M is differentiable, and
(ξ∗2 )
′(γ) < 0. Also, D′(γ) =
〈
ξ
∗(γ),b′γ
〉 for all γ ∈ int Γ.
Proof: The set M defined in (28) is open, therefore
the following first order condition must be satisfied at ξ∗:
G(γ, ξ∗) = bγ −
∂I⋆+
∂ξ
(AT ξ∗) = 0. (30)
This equation implicitly defines ξ∗(γ) with a Jacobian
∂G
∂ξ
= −∂
2I⋆+
∂ξ2
,
which is negative definite for every ξ ∈ M because of the
strict convexity of I⋆+ (strictly convex function composed
with a linear function). Thus, it is nonsingular and the
implicit theorem function furnishes the differentiability of
ξ∗(γ). Moreover,
(ξ∗)′ =
(
∂2I⋆+
∂ξ2
)−1
∂G
∂γ
. (31)
The inverse of the Hessian of I⋆+ is positive definite, and
∂G
∂γ is the column vector with entries (0,− 12e−γ). Hence,
left-multiplying (31) by the transpose of ∂G∂γ yields
0 <
(
∂G
∂γ
)T
(ξ∗)′ = −1
2
e−γ(ξ∗2 )
′,
and so (ξ∗2 )′ < 0. Finally, since for every γ ∈ int Γ we have,
D(γ) = 〈ξ∗(γ),bγ〉 − I⋆+(AT ξ∗(γ)),
it follows that D is differentiable and
D′(γ) =
〈
ξ∗(γ),b′γ
〉
+
〈
(ξ∗)′(γ),bγ − ∂I
⋆
+
∂ξ
(AT ξ∗(γ))
〉
;
the second term vanishes due to (30).
The next theorem in conjunction with Proposition 3
completely characterizes the unique optimal spatial density,
solution to problem (16).
Theorem 5: The optimization problem defined by (19) and
(18) admits a unique optimal solution γ∗ ∈ int Γ.
Proof: For all γ ∈ Γ, define
F (γ) := sup
ϕ∈Fγ
∫
S
√
ϕ(x)dx,
and let Ψ(γ) = γ+2 logF (γ) denote the objective function
in (19). From Theorem 4 we know that F (γ) = −D(γ) over
int Γ, and Lemma 2 implies that Ψ(γ) = −∞ when γ is at
the boundary of the interval Γ. Thus, dom Ψ = int Γ, and Ψ
is proper. The function Ψ is also closed; indeed consider any
sequence {γk, wk} ⊂ epi Ψ such that (γk, wk) → (γ, w).
Recall that restricting a function to its effective domain does
not affect the epigraph; hence, we can assume that {γk} ⊂
dom Ψ. Then, by Proposition 4 we know Ψ is continuous
over its effective domain, and Ψ(γ) = limk→∞Ψ(γk) ≥
limk→∞ wk = w, which shows that (γ, w) ∈ epi Ψ. Now,
since Ψ tends to −∞ at the boundary of its effective domain,
we can find a scalar η such that the upper level set {γ ∈
dom Ψ : Ψ(γ) ≥ η} is nonempty and bounded. Therefore
we can invoke Theorem 1 to conclude that the set of maxima
Γ∗ is nonempty and compact; moreover, Γ∗ ⊆ int Γ.
For every γ∗ ∈ Γ∗ note that since γ∗ is an interior point
of Γ, the following first order condition must be satisfied:
Ψ′(γ∗) = 1 + 2
F ′(γ∗)
F (γ∗)
= 0. (32)
Combining Theorem 4 with Proposition 4, we get
F ′(γ∗) = − 〈ξ∗(γ∗),b′γ∗〉 = 12ξ∗2(γ∗)e−γ∗ .
Also, Proposition 3 leads to
D(γ) =
∫
S
dx
2AT ξ∗(γ)(x)
, for all γ ∈ int Γ,
which implies that D(γ) = 2 〈ξ∗(γ),bγ〉. Thus, returning to
(32) and after some simple algebra we conclude that every
γ∗ ∈ Γ∗ must satisfy
2ξ∗1(γ
∗) = τξ∗2 (γ
∗), (33)
where τ > 0. Let Γ˜ = {γ ∈ int Γ : ξ∗2(γ) < 0}, and note
from Corollary 2 that Γ∗ ⊆ Γ˜. From Proposition 4 it follows
that ξ∗2 is continuous, thus Γ˜ is an open set. Inside this set,
(ξ∗2 )
′(γ) < 0 and by Proposition 3 it is clear that ξ∗1 should
be increasing so that the density defined in (29) integrates to
unity over S. Hence, returning to (33) we conclude that the
maximizer γ∗ has to be unique.
Corollary 3: The solution to (16) can be written as
ϕ∗(x) =
K
(τ + 2‖x‖)2 , for all x ∈ S, (34)
where K > 0 is a normalization constant.
Proof: Letting K = (τ/2ξ∗1(γ∗))2, the result readily
follows by plugging (33) back in (29).
Remark: If a demand is placed at location x, then from
(12) we note that τ + 2‖x‖ is the average time the agent
has to wait before he can place another demand in S. This
is the source of the spatio-temporal dependence between the
location and the rate of demands, and not surprisingly, it is
reflected on the shape of the optimal spatial density ϕ∗.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section we provide simulations that shed light on
the theoretical results developed in the previous sections.
Let Sρ = {x ∈ R2 : ‖x‖ ≤ ρ} be the support of
densities, and τ = 0.1. If the physical constraint imposed
by the agent carrying and placing the targets on S were
removed and the rate were fixed, then the distribution that
attains the maximum system time as λ/v → ∞ is uniform;
this was proved in [4] using a Hardy-Littlewood-Po´lya
inequality. However, when the spatio-temporal dependence
is introduced, a uniform distribution will induce a rate that
is smaller than λϕ∗ . This is because ϕ∗ is more concentrated
around the depot location than a uniform spatial density
and hence the agent has to travel less distance on average
between placement of successive targets. Figure 1 shows the
plot of the ratio of the system time T ∗ := T (pi∗, ϕ∗) and
TU := T (pi
∗, ϕuniform) with respect to increasing size of the
region S. As it can be seen, ϕ∗ yields 20% higher system
time than a uniform distribution for ρ as low as 1.
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Recall that the pair (pi∗, ϕ∗) constitutes an equilibrium for
the game in the limit as v → 0+. Therefore, understanding
how the relative error between T ∗ and the measured optimal
system time T ∗m decreases as v becomes closer to zero is an
issue of practical significance. To that end, we implemented
in Matlab the TSP-based routing policy described in Section
IV based on the Lin & Kernighan’s algorithm [11]. The
results obtained are gathered in Figure 2, where we note that
for v = 0.01 the relative error |T ∗−T ∗m|/T
∗ is already less
than 5%. This observation is actually not surprising, since
as implied in [9], the expression for the system time (15)
in heavy load is usually a fairly good approximation for the
system time under “intermediate” load regimes.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We studied a strategic dynamic vehicle routing problem
where demands are place in a bounded region S by an agent
with unitary capacity operating from a depot. We formulated
the corresponding complete information zero-sum game,
with the average waiting time of a typical demand as the util-
ity function, and showed that an equilibrium in the limiting
regime when the vehicle travels arbitrarily slower than the
adversarial agent is given by the pair of a TSP-based routing
policy and a unique power-law spatial density centered at
the depot location. While the TSP based routing policy and
its performance analysis has been adopted from [4], [18], the
results on the optimal spatial density were rigorously derived
using tools from conjugate duality and results concerning
the maximization of concave integral functionals subject
to linear equality constraints. Remarkably, all the results
obtained hold for any bounded region S with a sufficiently
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Fig. 2. Relative error of optimal system time T ∗ as a function of
the speed v.
smooth boundary, and in particular also for regions with
holes. This is an important feature since it allows to introduce
support constraints for the spatial distribution adopted by the
adversary, which serves as a good abstraction for scenarios
involving predator-prey interactions and criminal pursuit.
Also note that since lower bounds for the average system
time for dynamic vehicle routing under heavy load often take
the form of concave integral functionals (see e.g. [8]), the
convex analytic approach applied in this paper could be used
to formally analyze the performance of policies under worst
case scenarios.
Regarding avenues for future research, it would be in-
teresting to relax the complete information assumption. In
particular, we are interested in incorporating estimation of
ϕ∗ into the strategy set of the system planner. Accordingly,
it would be interesting to incorporate estimation cost into the
utility function of the game and investigate its effects on the
optimal strategies. Such a setup could also provide a natural
framework for the formal study of geographic profiling [17],
[13], where the objective is to determine the most probable
area of a criminal (predator) hideout (“anchor point”) based
on observed attack locations. It would also be interesting to
study strategic dynamic vehicle routing problems involving
multiple coordinated adversaries.
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